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1Moving the Needle, Filling the Streets
Governments rise and fall, strengthen and weaken, in part because of their
control of information flows. Militaries shift their attention increasingly to
the impact of themedia on their missions. Corporations prosper and blossom
or are destroyed and wither depending on their mastery of the changed
information technologies.1Civil society follows suit. New modes of affecting
opinion, mobilizing populations and extending influence are developed,
tested and measured for effectiveness. This race for new means for reaching
populations – and the rise of new modes for assessing, influencing and
regulating persuasion – becomes a massive exercise in what one might call
“the new strategic communication,” one that is persuasive and encompasses
disruptive technologies for reception and pervasive technologies for surveil-
lance. We have always had strategic communication. But the combination
of new technologies, new tools of surveillance and new techniques for
analysis of ever more available data raises the consequences and possibilities
of strategic communication to new levels. And the structure, ubiquity and
potency of strategic communication accentuate concerns about the rele-
vance of existing norms and institutions, the existing underpinnings and
foundations for thinking about freedom of expression.
In a world of totalizing capacities to collect and analyze data, old views
of what constitutes “autonomy” or what constitutes privacy have a quaint,
reality-denying, archaic quality. The president of Brazil, in an immediate
reaction to disclosures that conversations among her government officials or
national leaders in Latin America were monitored, called for a redesign of the
Internet to prevent key messages from necessarily being transported through
servers under U.S. jurisdiction. The recognition seemed palpable that an
1 See Harold Innis’s magisterial work, Empire and Communications (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1950).
1
observed society, whether observed by one’s own government or a foreign one,
will behave and speak differently from one that is unmonitored.
It is not just shifts in data collection and use that undergird or explain
a new strategic communication environment. Cross-border efforts to per-
suade intensify. Two brothers in Boston wreaked havoc in 2013 using basic
Internet-received knowledge to create homemade bombs. An immediate
question was whether they were influenced by forces outside American
borders; what was the role of an Imam in Yemen or of Salafist cells in
Dagestan? Borders became significant markers for fathoming the depth of
what occurred. And remedially, the issue was what mix of ideas, what path-
ways of education, what surveillance of speech would be necessary to prevent
similar events from occurring in the future. There was nothing new in a
distant group of dissidents reaching across boundaries to locate new recruits.
Still, the wars of the twenty-first century seemed to be reshaping these efforts
and certainly deploying new technologies in the process. The Boston
Marathon bombing reinforced the high demand for intelligence informa-
tion for preventative purposes in the post-9/11 world. Concern for general
limits on government power were accompanied by a wish that benign
governments would master information flows as a way of reducing risk.
Events like these have intensified inquiry into patterns of discourse and
efforts to understand how individuals and groups reach across swaths of
physical and emotional terrain to dislocate violently the status quo.
The sense of disruption, of course, is not only about borders. Authorities
fret about the gaps in their hold on quickly changing realities in processes
of mobilization and disruption. In August 2011, British Prime Minister
David Cameron momentarily called for consideration of special and
sweeping powers in angry response to riots and looting in the streets of
London. These involved new regulations to prevent the use of social
media to encourage criminal behavior and endanger the social order.
Cameron spoke of rules that would give government authority, in extreme
circumstances, to shut down social networks locally or nationally.2
Reactions to Cameron’s remarks were harsh. What Cameron sought,
critics around the world proclaimed, were just the kind of free-expression-
threatening actions that were used that year by Mubarak,3 Assad,4 and
2 See “London Riots 2011: David Cameron’s Speech to Parliament,” International Business
Times, August 11, 2011.
3 See, for instance, Joshua Hersh, “Egyptian Activists See Hypocrisy In BART Shutdown,
London Riots,” The Huffington Post, August 16, 2011.
4 See, for instance, Marta Cooper, “Reaction to Cameron’s Plans for Social Media Crackdown,”
Free Speech Blog, Index on Censorship, August 11, 2011.
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their authoritarian ilk.5 Questions were raised, as well, as to whether
Britain, or any other state, could enforce any such law, underscoring the
breadth of new challenges to state management of a demanding and
complex information environment.6
The substantial changes in technologies, geopolitics and the flows of infor-
mation necessitate a wholesale reevaluation of the way in which states might
think about their powers and their role. States (and other powerful entities in
society) might rhetorically embrace a world of transparency while simulta-
neously seeking, if they can, to master the new environment, turning new
technologies to their advantage. States experiment with ways to “move the
needle” of public opinion among targeted populations utilizing advanced
tools of communication and integrate the consequences in their theories of
speech and conduct. Understanding the transformed spheres of communica-
tion in the modern world also requires appreciation of the expanding appli-
cation of international human rights norms. The heroic efforts, particularly
in the post–World War II era, to create a coherent body of human rights and a
set of institutions that would support these rights included, of course, interna-
tional norms of free expression. It is a commonplace, and a comfortable one,
that principles of free expression form the bedrock of Western society and,
aspirationally, of the world at large. But challenges exist as to the meaning of
these principles and how they are adapted in places that have very different
cultures, very different organizations of the state and very different ideas of the
individual in society. Indeed, describing them as “principles” seems to place
them above the area of ordinary debate, yet they are both hard won and always
and everywhere delicate. The very assertions that advocates of free expression
take for granted – that is, the interpretation of norms, such as Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) – remain
subject to extensive debate in courts and in legislatures.
Max Weber famously observed that a necessary condition of being a state is
that it has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.7 In the twenty-first
5 See, for instance, Jillian C. York, “Democracies Learn from Mubarak’s Example,” Al Jazeera,
August 18, 2011. See also Uri Friedman, “Twitter Braces for U.K. Censorship Following the
Riots,” The Atlantic Wire, August 11, 2011.
6 See Omar El Akkad, “Britain’s Musings of Social-Media Ban Fraught with Technical
Difficulty,” Globe and Mail, August 11, 2011.
7 MaxWeber, “Politics as a Vocation” (Munich: Duncker and Humboldt, 1919). This idea is also
examined inMaxWeber,Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1922).
For a more recent exploration, see Hannes Wimmer, “The State’s Monopoly on Legitimate
Violence. Violence in History and in Contemporary World Society as Challenges to the State”
(paper presented at Transformations of Statehood from a European Perspective, Austrian
Academy of Sciences Vienna, January 23–25, 2003), http://homepage.univie.ac.at/johann.wim-
mer/Wimmer-AkadWiss.pdf.
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century, the Weberian formula is in the process of being amended. The
argument will be more frequently made that for a state to be a state, even a
democratic state, it must have greater sway over the legitimate use of informa-
tion. This is an idea so apparently inconsistent with existing notions of global
press norms and human rights that I want to qualify it immediately. As with
Weber’s idea of the monopoly on the use of violence, the state’s command
over information can be delegated. As with the monopoly on the use of
violence, it can be bargained away by treaty or agreement. Many states that
deem themselves to be democratic have, over centuries, engaged in this
process, bargaining their power over information or limiting it by law or
constitution or treaty. But what is implicit in this argument is that a state
will seek to recover elements of its monopoly over violence that it has dele-
gated, bargained away or lost through other means. Perhaps the same is true
with respect to speech and the state’s recuperative impulse.8
States – for good and for ill – are the mode for organizing national defense
and national security. They are structures that define, enshrine and protect the
political system evolved within their borders. They are the imperfect backstop
for language and culture. They referee national identity. States are the vessels
for what may be a vanishing commodity: notions of citizenship and loyalty.
I list these characteristics because all of them depend on systems of informa-
tion and the flow of images – systems that have a profound impact on how
a state functions and performs for its citizenry. Access to information and
internal modes of freedom of expression to provide for accountability become
crucial elements of conceptualizing the state and systems of information
within it. These are merely part of an overall system that incorporates the
architecture, uses and deployment of speech and expression.
Transnational strategic communication coupled with new technologies
challenges these capacities, rendering problematic any neat summary of
speech, regulation and the state. Let me refine my Weberian suggestion.
The point is not that a state ought in principle to have management capability
over information flows. Rather, it is that major elements of such management
are inevitable – and their scope somewhat locally determined. Put differently,
in the constitutionally circumscribed areas where a government justifiably
(and consistent with carefully restrictive international norms) has a proper role
to play, it should have the implied capability of doing so, including through
8 Harold Innis developed the related concept of a “monopoly of knowledge” to describe how
institutions (e.g., the clergy, scribes, guilds, merchants, etc.) were able to secure power through
control over or uniquemastery of communication and information. See, especially,Harold Innis,
Empire andCommunications (Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 1950), andHarold Innis,The
Bias of Communication (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951).
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managing technical challenges.9 The new strategic communication capabil-
ities often imply a search for an infrastructure of speech and society that shifts
toward unencumbered speech but recognizes and honors an appropriate role
for the state. This formula embraces responses to powerful states that abuse
control of information and weaker states where the capacity to function needs
buttressing.
anxieties and free expression
How should those moved to think about expression in society consider the
multiple impacts of the new environment on the rules of speech engagement?
How can one freshly evaluate the stake that one state or society has in
the media structure of another state or how the flow of information affects
human rights and regional and global stability? What new institutions and
new approaches will emerge from the current challenges? In struggling with
these questions much of free expression jurisprudence will have to be reaf-
firmed so that its vital basic gifts are maintained. In some significant respects,
that jurisprudence is pinned to a classic model of the diffusion of information
in which deliberation and democratic processes establish a government that
sets the rules (consistent with constitutional imperatives) about speech and its
limits within the boundaries of its authority. International norms are an
increasingly cited repository for foundational principles, but these norms,
despite the huge efforts to ground them in practice, are themselves under
scrutiny, the circumstances of their adoption put in question.
The ongoing processes of reexamination and reinforcement of free
expression are the consequence of at least two major and disparate anxieties.
Every day sees fear by those in power (governments, industry incumbents,
long-established religions and others) that new technologies and new develop-
ments threaten their dominion. For these entities, particularly governments,
the capacity to control information at critical moments becomes a defining
element of stability and preservation of power. Disruption is basic to new
communications capabilities, and disruption naturally leads to apprehension.
And there is a sharply contrasting fear among civil society segments and others:
deep anxiety about the future of freedom of expression itself – a haunting
and often undeclared pessimism triggered by the feeling that these same
potentially liberating technologies, the Internet and social media, have instead
ushered in an era of surveillance and formal and informal government
9 Austin Sarat, ed., Sovereignty, Emergency, Legality (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2010) explores some related questions.
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control, with concomitant containment of individual autonomy.10 These
competing anxieties are backdrops for how states, civil society, corporations,
religions and other organizations and groups seek to adjust and cope with a
dramatically changing set of information-related realities.
Some states have migrated from exercising (often repressively) what seemed
like a monopoly over information to being relatively weak in the face of
sophisticated media organizations, corporations schooled in the arts of per-
suasion, a public empowered by information technology and, increasingly,
media-savvy insurgent and rebel entities. Governments, rather than shaping
their information environment, see themselves increasingly subject to the
shaping processes of entities and forces (within and without the state’s borders)
over which they have little or no control.
These twinned and basic fears were on parade during the dramatic events
of what is more nostalgically, ironically and quaintly called the Arab Spring.
Events of 2011, 2012 and beyond in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Libya and Bahrain
provided a new set of extraordinary examples for understanding the relation-
ship of state power to free expression. Governments have been forced to
engage with democratic protest or use brutal force to impair mobilization.
States have been freshly confronted with the extraordinary strength of words
and their combination into narrative – whether generated by social media,
popular protests, neighboring polities, religious movements or reform and
human rights organizations, domestic and transnational. One reality – and
often a real shock across all states – is that at a critical moment the once
overbearing state may turn out to be naked and powerless. States that prided
themselves on their power to manage domestic narratives and influence
international imaginings have found both talents in peril. In the era of
WikiLeaks and the Internet, states have become ever more concerned
about their ability to protect state secrets that in the past, even under the
most restrictive notion of allowances, would have been protectable. In the
United Kingdom, an exasperated member of parliament, commenting on
social media’s undermining of a superinjunction (a judicial order preventing
newspapers from mentioning the name of a football player accused of
peccadillos or even mentioning the existence of the order), said that
Twitter made the “law look an ass.”11 An essay in The Guardian made a
similar point:
10 See, for instance, EvgenyMorozov, TheNet Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New
York: PublicAffairs, 2011); Joseph Turow, The Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry is
Defining Your Identity and Your Worth (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012).
11 Andrew Soar, “Ryan Giggs Named as Footballer at the Centre of Twitter Privacy Row,” culture
and life, May 23, 2011.
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Twitter may have been credited with helping topple Arab dictatorships.
[But] . . . it is naive to assume that it, and other social media, are in essence
benign, that their main political function since the Iranian protests of 2009
has been to aid revolutionaries in communication, although it is a point so
often glibly made. What is accurate, then, is to see Twitter as an amoral,
disruptive force.12
The architecture of speech in society is shifting and changing, then, and
this intensifies anxieties of loss – loss of perceived past control – as processes
of generating and diffusing information are moving into strikingly diverse
paths simultaneously. I emphasize the double impact of these phenomena:
the seemingly decentralized, disintermediated revolution in patterns of
discourse called social media, and the consolidating relationship between
information and power that can be called strategic communication. These
two developments – each massive in scope – together place in doubt how
societies, organized in states, come to think about images, words, power,
borders and identity. These two tendencies – exemplified by increased use
of social media and strengthened strategic communicators – seem oddly
complementary in force and may converge. In its most typical instantiation,
social media are deemed bottom up and strategic communication top down.
But social media become invaded with power, and civil society becomes
engaged in the power orientation of its more frequently strategic competitors.
Together they can be cumulative in impact and challenge to the state.
Social media – Facebook, Twitter, and the affordances of the Internet – create
startling new networks of communication, expanding on person-to-person,
person-to-group and group-to-person. The growth of strategic communication –
heavily subsidized, usually transnational, engineered and often deceptive – can
wreak havoc on traditional ideas of community realization and self-determination
(for which speech is a significant element of making vital political decisions).
As a result of the growth of social media and the expansion of powerful, cross-
border engagements, the standard responses of states and their democratic
adaptations are upended.
Speech rights have long been justified and ennobled as signals and aspira-
tions of individualism, autonomy and informed self-determination; now, the
tendencies are intensified for information and data flows to be captured by
large-scale entities – corporations, states and others, a result contested by
efforts to democratize access to knowledge and public rights to information.
From a context in which speech, including speech of transnational origin, was
12 Daniel Sabbagh, “Twitter’s Wild West Brings Politicians into Line,” The Guardian,
May 23, 2011.
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theorized as part of an ever-evolving mix for nurturing national identities,
information flows are increasingly seen as overwhelming local cultures and
undermining belief systems, thereby subverting traditional loyalties. From a
context in which speech and its destabilizing capacity were often managed by
all-powerful states, the borderless nature of speech flows now seems to present
threats of random violence and conflict.
rethinking strategic communication
Each substantial technological and organizational breakthrough in informa-
tion flows leads or should lead to revisiting and possible adjustment of the
structure of free expression and the responsibility and privileges of the key
actors, especially the state. In this book, I present a series of inquiries into
global actors and the relationship between their information strategies and
geopolitical impacts. The first half attempts to reframe the emerging world of
information flows and reformulate the significant role of free expression
concepts within it. In Chapter 2, I articulate specific definitions of “strategic
communication” and “strategic communicators.” The term “strategic com-
munication,” as it has developed, owes much to military vocabularies and
uses, but the kind of interventionist approach that it entails spills over into the
broader world of public relations, public diplomacy and intensive marketing.
In Chapter 3, I turn to a specific strategic effort: organized advocacy of
“narratives of legitimacy” as a way to provide moral and consensual bases for
modes of governance. Governments seek to create temporary alliances or use
other tools to produce or block such narratives with consequences that affect
deployment of military assets, sanctions, preparation of shadow governments
and mobilization of populations. Strategic deployment of narratives of legiti-
macy powerfully affects the success of large-scale multilateral approaches to
conflict-ridden events, such as civil war in Syria or protests in Egypt and Libya.
These narratives are often performative, designed to be effective in a way that
ensures change, rather than merely to reflect it. Their target is a group of key
actors rather than a mass audience.
An analytic turn is one indicator of what makes a communicator strategic.
In Chapter 4, I introduce the concept of a “diagnostic” as a mode of analyzing
information flows. The more the environment consists of strategic communi-
cators, the more it will depend on increasingly scientific ways of understand-
ing the context that various actors seek to change. In the “Long War against
Terror,” an entire industry emerged as an effort to describe how certain ideas
filtered into societies and gained adherents. There were already important
notions of evaluating the way media may intensify movement to reshape
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loyalties, enhance or diminish conflict or exacerbate or reduce deprivation of
human rights and genocide. But this process is accelerating. No communica-
tions effort of scale and significance can be deemed strategic if it is not
sensitive to the particular environment in which the information intervention
takes place. No such communications effort can be strategic without an
understanding of the increasingly elaborate techniques of competitors. The
diagnostic approach outlined here arises from observations in the world of
“media assistance” on the one hand and public diplomacy on the other, where
fathoming the localized character of information flows is central to designing
and implementing meaningful action. But all this is now supplemented by the
transformation in gathering and analyzing “big data” to personalize, target and
create new assemblages for persuasion.
The systemic efforts by which states attempt to produce and further strategic
narratives, and the exploration of the different environments in which strategic
communicators operate, emphasize the very different nature of the commu-
nicative strategies that all players now face on the ground level. In the last
two decades, accentuating a long-existing condition, a number of asymmetric
contexts of communication have emerged; these provide important clues into
the rethinking of strategies of communication. Chapter 5 focuses on these
contexts, in which innovation or unorthodox techniques and unethical uses of
communications allow the weak or underestimated to threaten the strong and
arrogant. These instances of asymmetry strike fear in governing authorities as
“men in caves” purportedly do strategic battle with the historically triumphant
keepers of Western public relations traditions. Asymmetric strategic players pit
destabilizing communication efforts against more conventional approaches.
The Internet may lend itself to asymmetric information techniques, both
trans-border and local. Furthermore, the insufficiently examined area of
shaping and funding circumvention techniques has elements of the asym-
metrical. The process of designing, diffusing and encouraging the use of
software that avoids state filtering and banning is an outcropping of potentially
provocative intrusions on a state’s own management of its narratives of
legitimacy.
To emphasize the connection between structure and principle, I turn, in
Chapter 6, to “strategic architectures” – large-scale efforts to fix or stabilize the
relationship of states and other major players to information flows. These
wholesale approaches include active rethinking of communications structures
by powerful states so as to maintain control over their own narratives and affect
relevant communications systems outside their borders. These are designs not
only of government but of the corporate empires for whom communication is
key and certainly for the media companies themselves. For those who seek to
Moving the Needle, Filling the Streets 9
ensure a particular narrative – for example, of governmental legitimacy,
religious authenticity or the advantages of consumerism – establishing an
infrastructure they can control is significant. Globally and nationally, the
efforts are many. In recent decades, debates over the means of designing
broadcast systems, satellite systems, cable systems and, most recently, the
Internet all involve these structural aspects of communications strategies.
I use competing visions of Internet structures as an example of an exercise in
strategic architectures of communication.
The second part of the book is composed of case studies. This includes
inquiries into categories of strategic communicators, actors who work to
expand influence and persuasion and manipulate or affect the rules of entry,
and inquiries into the interaction among strategic communicators and system
architecture (how any particular market is designed and structured). In
Chapter 7, I use, as a case study, the perception by Iran (in the pre-Rouhani
era) that its value system was being systematically attacked through informa-
tion strategies of other states, particularly the United States. In this chapter, I
explore circumstances in which external interventions are portrayed as “Soft
War” as opposed to soft power. Media interventions that contribute – or are
thought to contribute – to regime change are a trademark exercise of strategic
communication, and their study allows the examination of important issues.
This is a specific locus for understanding the key role of states as players in this
strategic universe. Concern with information flows is a surrogate, in part, for
concerns about general political attitudes in themarket to be affected. Here, as
advocate and seller in the marketplace, State A uses many tools – propaganda
and public diplomacy, cultural outreach efforts and educational exchange,
even force – to alter public attitudes in State B, State C and beyond. Chapter 7
also provides strong insight into competing ideas for Internet structure and
how these ideas are framed for international discussion.
I do not include a chapter specifically on commercial entities, corporations
and businesses as strategic communicators. They are vital players and pio-
neers, but much has been published about their history and continued role in
defining transnational information flows.13 They are often the leaders, for
better or worse, in readdressing the relationship between sender and recipient,
through the extended science of data gathering and analysis. Instead, I include
case studies of two other categories of strategic actors: religions and NGOs.
Chapter 8 looks at the realm of strategic communication concerning religious
13 This has been the case for several decades. For two examples, see Armand Mattelart,
Multinational Corporations and the Control of Culture: The Ideological Apparatuses of
Imperialism (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), and Herbert Schiller, Culture Inc: The
Corporate Takeover of Public Expression (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
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entities. The chapter addresses how, often from outside a state’s boundaries,
such groups seek to shift the spiritual allegiances of a target population
over time. Religions, as historic strategic communicators, use whatever new
and old technologies are available. Religions compete with each other and
with secular forces so the issues of “substitutability” emerge as well (who
competes in what relevant market).
I turn to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Chapter 9. NGOs
have becomemore significant players in the world of strategic communication
as they seek to affect various publics. In tribute to the effectiveness of these
creative entities, some governments (and not just those deemed repressive)
dispute their roles in affecting a public sphere or competing to define rights
and loyalties. These NGOs are in some ways creatures of modern opportuni-
ties. Many exist in a transnational space, but often have very specific localized
targets and impacts. They may be less encumbered by local bureaucratic
hurdles that impede thinking strategically about their objectives. Yet they
are, despite their conveniently idealistic name, often supported by govern-
ments because they have this flexibility that may be denied to states them-
selves. I focus on NGOs involved in “democracy promotion,” entities that seek
to affect political reform and shape opinion and outcomes regarding media
structures, including the structure of the Internet.
Chapter 10 is about an architectural feature of strategic communication that
helps us understand competitive strategies. I discuss the concept of platforms,
bases from which to proclaim and advance a brand, an idea, a film or a
national identity. The objective is to show the struggle to seize such platforms
as a zone for engagement in power. The platforms that are designed to project
one narrative can be hijacked to produce quite a different one. I focus on
the Beijing Olympics as a platform and the use of it by a variety of actors, each
with its own strategic agenda. The platform (including the need for a platform,
the effort to protect who gets to use the platform and the effectiveness of
the platform) is fought over by many idea-related advocates. As the Internet
becomes a site of immediate and viral platforms, with significant consequen-
ces for the debate of issues of public importance, the mode of creating, seizing
and maintaining such platforms is important.
In Chapter 11, I look at the behavior of strategic communicators when
faced with apertures created by new technologies and the complexities of an
informal and uncertain governance structure. The case study is a challenging
example – the world of delivery of channels through satellites – a mechanism
for distribution that, in the past, has sidestepped sovereignty and sought to
avoid content regulation. I have chosen this case study because of the signifi-
cance of the story to the future of the Internet. It is a study that demonstrates
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the painful efforts to adjust or modify governmental inclinations to control
new technologies where barriers to entry are low. But it is also an example of
the persistence of states, determined to exercise control where needed, to
experiment with regulatory alternatives. New modes of regulation become a
defensive response to new styles of entry – as was the case with the expanded
use of cable distribution of information in a previous decade.
institutional foundations, the market
for loyalties and free expression
Looking at strategic communication through the lens of a “market for
loyalties” will help in integrating all these ideas, in understanding how all
the developments I have described, and the world as seen through the growth
of the Internet and the strengthening of strategic communication and strategic
architectures, affect issues concerning freedom of expression. In explicating
these issues, I return to arguments I made in an earlier work, Media and
Sovereignty. There I defined a market for loyalties as a context in which large-
scale competitors for power use the regulation of communications to organize
a cartel of imagery and identity among themselves. I wrote:
The “sellers” in this market are all those for whom myths and dreams
and history can somehow be converted into power and wealth – classically
states, governments, interest groups, businesses, and others. The “buyers” are
the citizens, subjects, nationals, consumers – recipients of the packages of
information, propaganda, advertisements, drama, and news propounded by
the media. The consumer “pays” for one set of identities or another in several
ways that, together, we call “loyalty” or “citizenship.” Payment, however, is
not expressed in the ordinary coin of the realm: It includes not only com-
pliance with tax obligations, but also obedience to laws, readiness to fight in
the armed services, or even continued residence within the country. The
buyer also pays with his or her own sense of identity.14
One can look at this idea of a market primarily within national boundaries,
with government usually the entity that allows the cartel to operate and often
part of the cartel itself. Indeed, the product of a stable market for loyalties
could be a pragmatic version of “national identity.” When the state and those
in power are efficiently managing this market, the result may be what I have
called a “bubble of identity,” in which attention is paid, often censorial, to
14 Monroe E. Price,Media and Sovereignty: TheGlobal Information Revolution and Its Challenge
to State Power (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002), 32. I also explore these issues in
Monroe E. Price, Television, the Public Sphere, and National Identity (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995).
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what is tolerated, encouraged and discouraged. It is this management of the
market that yields what I call here narratives of legitimacy – the collection of
ideas and narratives employed by a dominant group or coalition to maintain
power. This market for loyalties approach has powerful explanatory force in a
transnational form. Globalization involves, specifically, the desire by external
strategic communicators to break or reinforce local cartels (depending
on interest) and much of this book is devoted to showing how this happens.
It is this process that creates opportunities for gain and anxieties for loss.
In market after market, ideas of free expression developed with one set of
“sellers” of allegiances in mind, only to see them replaced by others. And the
replacements – those who succeed in breaking preexisting cartels – disturb
and destabilize. What is significant is the scope and scale by which strategic
communicators have succeeded in the process of cartel disruption and how
home governments have responded.
For these reasons, the notion of the market for loyalties is a helpful prism
for understanding what is “strategic” about strategic communication. Strategic
communicators often understand that it has hardly ever been a single govern-
ment alone that regulates or controls the nature of amarket for loyalties within its
boundaries. As strategic communicators increase, the market for loyalties within
any state becomes the product of multiple interests – other states, transnational
religious entities, NGOs and others. The idea of a market for loyalties, with
competitors trying to enter or block others, also begins, in a new way, to reframe
ideas of free expression. It is a roadmap for understanding strategic communica-
tion and strategic architectures for altering flows of information. Rules concern-
ing the right to receive and impart information or otherwise enact free expression
principles become instruments used by many, inside and outside the state, to
help shape the market, in addition to serving as an overarching philosophy that
should have a normative impact on the overall architecture of speech.
The market for loyalties analysis underscores how strategic communicators
manifest the anxieties that come with increasing or decreasing power. The
perception in the United States after 9/11 that it had inadequate knowledge or
resources to affect the hearts and minds of Muslim youth led to a decade, at
least, of efforts to alter patterns of communication, understand the impact of
modes of communication and develop the relationship between communica-
tion and surveillance.15 Top-level communicators enacted different approaches
to free expression norms depending on their particular position or role at
specific times in theWar on Terror. Aggressive strategic communicators sought
15 For a critique of U.S. diplomatic efforts to engage Islam internationally through use of social
media, see Edward Comor and Hamilton Bean, “America’s Engagement Delusion: Critiquing
a Public Diplomacy Consensus,” International Communication Gazette 74, no. 3 (2012).
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to deploy free expression norms to break into markets; those with established
positions, even dominance, often used their power in local, regional and
national fora to guard their positions. These players were, of course, particularly
susceptible to anxieties about the breakdowns in systems that have been relied
on to maintain their defenses.
A next level of analysis involves methods of implementation, implementa-
tion for reinforcing or alteringmarket shares in a domestic or target society that
takes many forms. These include the use of law, the deployment of physical
force, engagement in negotiations, adroit deployment of technology and
creative use of subsidies. This kind of categorization can help demonstrate
how societies are evolving by indicating which modes become more effective
and which ones diminish. For example, onemight track whether international
norms (a form of law) have become more or less useful and in what contexts as
a mode of affecting behavior and policing boundaries of persuasion. A related
question would be the relationship of law to the use of force. Calling a means
of implementation the exercise of law has different implications from charac-
terizing the same or similar activities as an exercise of force. The order
establishing the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (inscribed
by the U.S.-appointed Coalition Provisional Authority) has and had all the
trappings of law.16 But the law was the ukase of an unelected officer who was
acting under the authority of the U.S. military, a belligerent occupier.
Characterizing the order as law satisfied the authority, but it was a subjective
labeling. The United States considers the projection of Radio Farda and the
Voice of America into Iran as the furtherance of free speech, while efforts to
block the channels by the Iranian government through jamming are consid-
ered (from the perspective of the sending society) closer to the use of force.
Many of the steps now taken to affect the entry of signals into a society are areas
for disputed characterization. These include monitoring, denying licenses,
pressuring lessors of satellite transponders, seizing control of transmitters to
prevent conflict-producing media and even bombing of offending broadcast-
ing outlets. Establishing standards for these actions remains elusive.17
16 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 65, “Iraqi Communications and Media
Commission,” CPA/ORD/20 March 2004/65. Order 65 mainly contains provisions that estab-
lish the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission. For an analysis of various rules
affecting Iraqi media, including Order 65, see Monroe E. Price, Douglas Griffin and
Ibrahim Al-Marashi, Toward an Understanding of Media Policy and Media Systems in Iraq:
A Foreword and Two Reports, CGCS Occasional Paper Series, Number 1 – May 2007
(Philadelphia: Center for Global Communication Studies, Annenberg School for
Communication, University of Pennsylvania).
17 One locus for debate has been the pro-genocidal journalistic efforts in Rwanda,made subject to
the jurisprudence of an international court, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
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One modern response of states to these concerns about power is to try to
replicate the old system and assure that, to the extent possible, information is
funneled through regulable intermediaries. This is often part of what might be
called the “architecture of the infrastructure” of information flows. There is a
hierarchy of control. If information leaks around intermediaries, the next step
will be to try to regulate the content providers. But they, too, are elusive in the
Internet era. In authoritarian societies, the result is an increased emphasis on
regulating the ultimate user, a crude return to punishment of the consumer,
the citizen, the subject. It is not difficult to find explicit examples of this
progression from structure to regulation to surveillance to punishment. Does
the state or do other strategic players resort to force because of an inability to
define and effectively apply law as a means of entering or defending a market?
Does this process relate to the weakening of law as a tool of regulation (or the
absence of law in fragile societies)? Violence against journalists could be an
example of this shift. From WikiLeaks to Ai Weiwei, arrests become a more
standard mode for controlling the narrative. When insecure and repressive
leaders consider even arrests insufficient, direct violence becomes prevalent.
What, in any circumstances – proclivities, racial attitudes, deep-seated
hate, lack of training, lack of resources – leads to the choice of one mode of
implementation rather than another? As the more acceptable of these
elements become more costly or impossible to deploy in an intensifying
competition among strategic competitors, the state attempts to restructure
the communication environment and restore its instruments of influence.
Ultimately, these approaches raise the general question: How does one
rethink and reclassify the structure of information flows in a time of strategic
communication and intense expansion of social media? In other words, how
do states respond? The question becomes of greater significance if, as many
believe, the functioning of states is, in any important way, a reflection or
consequence of the media system in which they operate. This is the kind of
question that Hallin and Mancini ask in their great Comparing Media
Systems.18 Why do media systems look the way they do? Is North Korea only
able to operate as it does because of its power to control patterns of distribution
of information? Egypt’s Mubarak may have fallen for many reasons, but
Mubarak’s inability to effectively control media was a contributing factor.
In these circumstances of regime or state survival (or anxiety about survival)
in the face of changing information realities, historic definitions of and
HASSAN NGEZE, Case No. ICTR-99–52-T, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
Trial Chamber I, December 3, 2003.
18 Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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justifications for media regulation or limitations on these forms come under
intense pressure. It is a question of the entire strategic model – namely how
states and other players will organize the architecture of information systems,
how they will diagnose the context for targeting messages and how they
will execute these strategies. This takes us back to the role of international
norms and their implications for competing models of regulating expression.
Speech regulation is an integral part of governance and national identity, but
the scope of such regulation was meant to be limited by these international
norms. After World War II and the introduction of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UHDR), the idea was substantially advanced (based on
Enlightenment traditions) that the right to receive and impart information
should exist regardless of frontiers. But Article 19 of the UHDR, and its later
embodiments in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 10, have built in the
notion of law-empowered limits. This notion of rights and limits is central, but
the meaning of the phrase is hardly well mapped or tested, and the search for
the appropriate interpretation of limitations continues. A world in which a
state has and exercises greater sovereignty over the flow of information within
its boundaries is different from a world in which a state is obliged to allow its
citizens access to information from any source, domestic or foreign. It is these
underpinnings, these institutional foundations for the relationship between
information and society, that are increasingly in question. Changing condi-
tions may alter how the various participants – including states, religions,
corporations, NGOs and others – perceive the virtue of particular norms.
Consider that, for significant historical reasons, freedom of expression
practices have most systematically been demarcated and organized through
geographical and other boundaries of state. It is these boundaries and the
governance they imply that have enabled and permitted specific and localized
approaches within the narrowly permissible restrictions clause of Article 19.
Where these regularized rules for expression and communication can no
longer be enforced – for example, because of technological impositions –
doctrinal confusion ensues. It is here that the reputed revolution in social
media is particularly significant. When institutions of law find it difficult to
address technological advances, states may resort to surveillance, violence and
other direct techniques for reassertion of their power. And where states do not
possess control over coercive, violent force either (where irregular clusters
take force into their own hands), they reduce their status as functioning states.
Such states cannot control their narratives of legitimacy.
This book, then, is an invitation to a dialogue or conversation that recog-
nizes shifts in the underpinnings of free speech frameworks. By studying
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whether the bases of free expression are changing, it provides insight into possible
remedial steps. By readdressing the response of states (and other strategic com-
municators) to shifts in information technologies, a better understanding of
the dynamics of influence and persuasion is obtained. These two elements – a
comprehension of rights and a description of institutional behavior – reflect
anxieties that shape attitudes toward flows of information and the narratives
of power.
Anxieties over information flows arise from collisions between existing
patterns of regulation and radically changing patterns of dissemination and
entry. Anxieties are intensified as ongoing events demonstrate the consequences
of new modes of diffusion and control. Institutions change, indeed disappear,
because of changes in information flows. Corporations have to change their
strategies to survive. Systems of providing education transform. No wonder
leaders quake; governments perceive such challenges as threats to their funda-
mental capacity to hold onto power. These anxieties lead to proposals to liberate
and efforts to control, to advances in freedom of expression and defenses by
those in power. Strategic communicators summoning such power as they have
(and for many, it is considerable) use a variety of techniques to hold some
competitors for control of narratives at bay and encourage others. How can one
characterize the techniques of states to ban, channel, filter and otherwise
control or affect the flow of information within their boundaries? How are
those techniques changing over time? And how are such changes related to
concepts of free expression?
The influence of strategic communicators is ubiquitous, as purveyors of
allegiances seek to stake out zones of persuasiveness – to claim, as it were, real
estate of potential loyalty. By examining this process, one might determine
what new modes of thinking about communications in society are emerging –
modes not always conveniently pigeonholed as authoritarian or promoting
free expression, modes that take into account the great new dynamics of
strategy and technology that each day intensify.
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